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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UXIVERSITY HEIGHTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
P etition.er,
Case
No, 9313

-vs.ST~~TE

TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF O·F RESPO·NDEN'T
ST1\TEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision
of the Tax Commission imposing additional corporation
franchise tax upon petitioner, University Heights, Inc.,
as a result of a disagreement as to the method of determining the value of the petitioner's corporate franchise.
The statute imposing the tax provides that it shall
be equivalent to 4 per cent of the net income of the corporation, or 1/20th of 1 per cent of the fair value during
the next preceding taxable year of the corporation's tan1
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gible property, whichever is greater. The petitioner determined in the present case that the tax should be paid
upon the property base and filed its return accordingly.
The question presented, therefore, is when the tax is paid
on the property base, whether the fair value of such
tangible property shall be computed from a determination made by the county assessor for property tax purposes, or on the other hand should consist of an evaluation
of the corporate property as determined by the Tax
Commission, the latter being greater.
No attempt will be made to defend the constitutionality of Sections 59-5-46 ( 9) and 59-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as such sections were not considered by the
Tax Commission in its determination of this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Tax Commission agrees substantially ''ith the
facts as set forth by the appellant. Ho,YeYer, in the interests of clarification and amplification the following brief
statement is submitted.
A corporation franchise tax deficiency 'Yas proposed
against the petitioner for the years 1956, 1957 and 1958.
The corporation in filing its returns computed the tax on
the property base arriving at the fair Yalue of its tangible personal property in Utah by considering the assessed
value, as determined by the county assessor, to represent
40 per cent of the fair value of the corporation. The petitioner reported and paid a tax in the amount of $707.79.
The State Tax Commission refused to accept this meth-

2
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od of determining the value of the property in question,
and in lieu thereof the said Tax Commission determined
the value of said property by reference to depreciated
book Yalues as shown by the balance sheets on returns
filed by the taxpayer for the years in question. Thereupon
the Tax Commission assessed an additional $619.70, plus
interest in the amount of $59.71. There is no showing
that the respondent acted in an arbitrary manner in
making said assessment or that it departed in any \vay
from standard valuation procedures.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND BY A
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S DETERMINATION OF
VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROPERTY TAX
PURPOSES, BUT MAY PROPERLY MAKE ITS
OWN DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE FOR
PURPOSES OF THE FRANCHISE TAX.
PoiNT II
THE UTAH FRANCHISE TAX IS NOT A
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE IS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF TAXATION ACCORDING TO
VALUE.
ARGU:JIENT
PoiNT I
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND BY A
COUNTY ASSESSOR'S DETERMINATION OF
VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROPERTY TAX
PURPOSES, BUT MAY PROPERLY MAKE ITS
3
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OWN DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE FOR
PURPOSES OF THE FRANCHISE TAX.
The taxpayer contends that it is proper to use the
assessed value of property for property tax purposes to
determine the ''fair value'' of its property for franchise
tax purposes. In this regard, petitioner contends that the
Tax Commission is bound to accept the County Assessor's
determination of "value" for purposes other than which
it was intended. With this contention the Tax Commission must respectfully disagree. The Tax Commission is
not bound to accept any valuation of the County Assessor.
Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that
the Commission "may of its own iniative order or make
an assessment or re-assessment of any property which
it deems to have been over-assessed or under-assessed or
which it finds has not been assessed.'' The County Assessor is not charged with the duty of determining the Yalue
of corporate franchises. The Tax Commission alone has
the responsibility to determine the correct amount of tax
due. See Section 59-13-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
The Tax Commission alone is empowered to examine the
taxpayer's records for the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return. Section 59-13-52, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. In fact, it would be intrepid for the Commission to adopt the petitioner's contentions and to do
so would be unfair to the petitioner itself. The County
Assessor by experience and profession is prepared to
determine the value of property. HowcYer, as will more
fully appear later, a tax upon the corporate franchise in
Utah is not a property tax, but rather is a tax upon the
4
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privilege of doing business within the state. This is true
even though the tax be computed upon the property base.
The Tax Commission maintains an experienced staff, the
sole function of which is to determine the value of property for purposes of the franchise tax. It should be
apparent that more accurate valuations may be obtained
by such a staff than could be obtained by following determinations made by a County Assessor motivated by
entirely different purposes. In fact, because of certain
pronouncements by the Utah State Supreme Court, the
Tax Commission could prudently assume no other course.
In the case of Utah-Idaho Suga.r Co. v. Salt Lake County,
60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106 (1932), Mr. Justice Thurman
stated in a concurring opinion that a certain tax was an
income tax and that taxation as a property tax was excluded ''. . . by the provision of the State Constitution
(Article 13, ~ 12) which reads as follows :
'Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to
prevent the Legislature from providing a stamp
tax, or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses
or franchise.' ''
That opinion continued:
''From the section just quoted nothing can be
clearer than that the constitutional convention regarded a property tax as one thing and a tax
based on income as another. The tax on property
\Yas provided for in the preceding sections of the
article, wrile a tax based on income was provided
for as a separate and distinct subject of taxation
in the section quoted. (As is the franchise tax.)
With this provision of the Constitution staring
him in the face, "~hat right or power had the
assessor of Salt Lake County to assume that the
5
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income or earnings from the management of physical property not reduced to tangible form could
be assessed as property the same as physical property may be assessed~''
The court held that the franchise to be a corporation was
not taxable property under the meaning of the Utah Constitution, Article 13, Section 2 and, therefore, could not
be assessed in the same manner as tangible property.
In the case of American Investment Corp. v. State
Tax Comm. of Utah, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331 (1942),
it was held that the tax imposed by a statute requiring
corporations annually to pay the state for the privilege of
exercising its corporate franchise or doing business in
the state, based on its net income allocated to the state,
was not a ''property tax'' nor an ''organization tax'' but
a "tax on the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise,'' or, in other words, on the privilege of doing business in the state. The court reiterated this doctrine in the
case of J. M. & M. S. Browning Co.

Y.

State Tax Co1n1n.,

107 Utah 457, 153 P. 2d 993 (1945). The court said:
'' The use of net income allocated to Utah as a
measure for the amount of tax to be paid by a
corporation for the privilege of doing business has
a reasonable common sense basis. The more net
income realized from doing business in Utah, the
more valuable the privilege and the higher the
tax.''
See also, EJncrald Oil Co.
379, 267 P. 2d

77~

Y.

State Tax Conun., 1

l~tah

(1954).
6
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2d

This position is in accord 'vith that taken by the Supreme C\n1rt of the United States when it held in the case
of ..-ltla11tic and Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, Pa., 190
U.~. 160, 23 S.Ct. 817, 47 L.Ed. 995 (1902), that a corporate franchise is valuable entirely apart from, or in addition to, the corporation's other property or assets.
l\Iodern cases generally sustain this view. In the case
of Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A.
2d 329, App., dismissed 324 U.S. 827, 65 S. Ct. 857, 89
L.E. 1394, (1944), it was held that being an excise tax, the
State may fix as a measure of the corporation franchise
the value of the corporation's property, even property
'vhich would not ordinarily be amenable to property tax.
And the California High Court has held that a franchise
tax differs rna terially from a property tax, as levied for
state and municipal purposes, in the basis prescribed for
computing the amount of the tax. America;n. States Water
Service Co. of California v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606,
88 P. 2d 770 (1939).
It is apparent that whether the franchise tax is computed upon the basis of net income or the basis of tangible
property that it cannot be considered a property tax.
It should follow that an independent evaluation of property for franchise tax purposes should be made. To accept
petitioner's contentions in this regard is to say that the
County _i\ ssessor 's determination should also be binding
in other non-property tax areas, such as the determination of value for inheritance tax purposes. To rule accordingly is to completely disrupt established procedures.

7
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It seems fairly evident from the Utah statutes alone
that the legislature intended the valuation of corporate
franchises to be placed on a different basis from the regular property tax assessment. The Utah Code Annotated,
Section 59-5-46.1 provides that the State Tax Commission in cooperation with the various county assessors shall
make an evaluation of all taxable property in the county
at least once every five years. However, in regard to corporate franchise taxes, Section 59-13-3 provides in part:
"Every bank or corporation ... for the privilege
of exercising its corporate franchise or for the
privilege of doing business in the state, shall annually pay to the state a tax equal to four per
cent of its net income for the preceding taxable
year computed and allocated to this state in a
manner hereinafter provided, or 1/20th of one per
cent of the fair value during the next preceding
taxable year of its tangible property in this state,
whichever is greater . . . " (Emphasis supplied)
Section 59-3-20(6) (f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, provides :
"The value of a corporation's tangible property
for the purpose of this section shall be the arerage
value of such property during the taxable year."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is evident from these statutory provisions that it
was intended by the legislature that the Yalue of a corporate franchise be determined more often than every
five years, whereas tangible property need only be reevaluated once every five years. It is also apparent that
a fair and accurate picture of the value of a corporation
franchise cannot be had by relying on an outmoded figure
8
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rPaehed by a County Assessor. Real property values tend
to remain constant. The value of business property is a
product of many factors and may fluctuate rapidly. The
legislature was a'vare of this and provided valuation procedures accordingly. The Tax Commission should not be
bound by the County Assessor's determination for nonproperty tax purposes.
PoiNT

II

THE UTAH FRANCHISE TAX IS NOT A
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE IS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF TAXATION ACCORDING TO
VALUE.
Petitioner contends that a franchise tax imposed
upon the "fair value" of its assets violates the Utah Constitution, Article 13, Section 3. It is contended that the
addition of the word ''fair'' to modify the value in money
or cash value standard set by the Utah Constitution is
unconstitutional and renders the section void.
Assuming the validity of this argument for property
tax purposes, it is submitted that petitioner fails to take
into consideration the fact that there are several constitutional provisions relating to taxation which apply to
property taxes but not to excise taxes. It is respondent's
position that Article 13, Section 3, is such a provision.
In Utah the franchise tax is an excise tax or a privilege
tax and need not be based on the value of the franchise.
Indeed, such a franchise tax is not subject to constitutional provisions regarding taxation according to cash
9
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value. In Utah the franchise tax is imposed upon the
privilege of doing business within the state. This proposition and the underlying principles concerned therewith
is succinctly stated by Cooley in his work on Taxation,
Volume II, Section 849, pg. 1714:
''Very often a tax would be unconstitutional and
void if a 'property' tax while it would be constitutional and valid if in reality an excise. It is natural, therefore, in such cases, that corporations
seek to have such taxes declared a property rather
than an excise tax. If the tax is held to be an excise
rather than a property tax, it is not subject to the
constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation, or the requirement of taxation
according to value.''
Section 850 of the same work provides:
''The constitutional provision that taxation shall
be according to value applies to property taxes
and not to excise taxes. It follows that if a tax on
franchises is a property tax it must be based on the
value of the franchise, ,,~hile if the tax on franchises is an excise tax it need not be based on their
value.''
The following also furnish support for the above proposition: Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 Ala. 143, 22 So.
627, 72 Am. St. Rep. 143 (1897); Kaiser Land & Fruit Co.
v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341 (1909): State v. Jlai.ne
Cen.t. R. Co., 74 Me. 376 (1883) ~State v. TT . . ester11 [Tniou
Tel. Co., 73 Me. 518 (1882); Standard C"ndergrouud Cable
v. Attorney r:cncraJ, 46 N.J. Eq. 270, 19 Atl. 733, 19 ..:\._m.
St. Rep. 394 (1890); Douglas ~4ircraft Co. v. Joli11Son, 13
Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 572 (1939) ~Jersey City v. Jlartin,
10
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126 N.J.L. 353, 19 Atl. 2d 40 (1941); Annotation 71
ALR 266.
As the standard of "value" for purposes of the franehise tax need not and cannot be the same as "value" for
property tax purposes and as the constitutional provision
that taxation shall be according to value does not apply
to the franchise tax, it should follow that petitioner's
argument herein must fail. Indeed, this may well be the
lesson of an early Utah case. In 1908 the Utah Constitution provided:
"All property in the state, not exempt under the
lawrs of the United States, or under this constitution shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law. The word 'property' as used in this article, is hereby declared to
include ... franchises . . . "
In construing the then existing constitutional provision, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Blackrock
Copper Jlining & Milling Co. v. Tingey, 34 Utah 369, 98
Pac. 180, held that the constitutional provision did not
apply to a license tax on the privilege of existing as a
corporation as distinguished from a license tax on the
franchise to carry on a particular business. It had been
contended that inasmuch as franchises were declared to
be property by the Constitution that it included all corporate {ra nclz iscs, and therefore no franchise tax could
be iHzposed except by valuation a;nd assessment by the
regular method. (Emphasis supplied) The court said:
"\\T e cannot agree \Yith this contention. To our
minds it is clear that the legislature did not in-

11
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tend the license tax imposed by the act in question as a property tax notwithstanding that the
constitution provides, in the section quoted from,
that franchises are property. Nor did the framers
of the constitution, in our opinion, intend to limit
the right of the leglsla ture to impose any other
than a property tax by valuation upon franchises
by what is said in Section 2, Article 13. If such
had been the intention of the framers of that instrument, all that was necessary to say was said
in Section 2 of that article. Why therefore specially refer to franchises again in Section 12 of the
same article, and there expressly state that the
legislature may impose a license tax upon franchises, if it was intended that no tax other than
a direct valuation tax could be imposed upon corporate franchise~ In our view these two provisions
are not even conflicting, but if they 'Yere, it would
be our duty to harmonize them and to giYe each
one its proper effect so far as possible under the
rules of construction.''
The present- day constitutional provisions haYe
changed, but it would appear that the Utah Court has
adopted the rules as stated by Cooley and as set forth in
Point I, supra. If this is true, then the requirement that
all property must be assessed at 40 per cent of its Yalue
does not apply to an assessment for franchise tax purposes. The legislature may fix a different rate for such
purposes and has in fact done so by the enactment of
Section 59-13-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As corporate
property is not subject to an assessment of 40 per cent
for franchise tax purposes, it should folio"'" that corporate
franchise values cannot be determined by subjecting them
to a faulty and illogical algebraical ratio based on pre12
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determined property tax values. Value for corporation
franchise tax purposes cannot be obtained by multiplying
a property tax by t\YO and one-half. It is, therefore,
apparent that if the Utah franchise tax is not a "prop(_lrty'' tax that the tax in itself is not subject to the requirement of taxation according to value and that the
addition of the word "fair" as found in 59-13-3, Utah
Code Annotated, cannot possibly constitute a violation
of the Utah State Constitution.
CONCLUSION
If "value" for property tax purposes and ''value"
for purposes of the franchise tax need not be the same,
it \Yould appear that the various cases interpreting the
meaning of ''fair value,'' ''actual value,'' ''cash value,''
etc., in different contexts, are meaningless in the present
case. Therefore, assuming the general rules as stated are
correct, it follows that because the Utah courts have determined that a franchise tax is not a property tax, it should
also determine that the constitutional provisions as to
taxation and assessment of real properties should not
apply in this area.
The decision of the
upheld.

Tax Commission should be

Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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